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DO YOU ABANDON ALL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS BY ACCEPTING EMPLOYMENT
WITH THE GOVERNMENT?: MANDATORY DRUG
TESTING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States appears to be overcome by a national feeling
of hysteria over the use of illegal drugs in our society.' President
Reagan characterized this feeling best in a live nationwide broadcast
on September 14, 1986 when he stated that drugs are menacing our
society, threatening our values, and killing our children.'
This concern over drug abuse has culminated in a national cru-
sade against drugs with the federal government leading the way.'
President Reagan has moved the nation's drug fight into the heart of
the American labor force by signing Executive Order 12564" on Sep-
tember 15, 1986. This Order, advocating a drug-free federal work-
place, followed passage by the House of Representatives of an anti-
drug bill' which would employ American military personnel to pro-
tect United States borders against drug smuggling, stiffens penalties
against drug dealers, and relaxes a prohibition against courtroom use
of evidence seized without a valid warrant.'
Under the Order, all federal employees in sensitive positions,'
© 1988 by Mary E. Lathers
1. See, e.g., Staff, Federal Workers Sue Over Drug Tests; S.J. Employees Oppose Rea-
gan Plan, S.J. Mercury News, Sept. 17, 1986, at 6A, col. 4. Describing the current climate on
Capital Hill, Rep. Charles E. Schumer, D-NY, stated: "It's a mania." Id. at 6A, col. 5. Is
This Another Fad Crisis?, L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 18, 1986, at 4, col. 1 ("The issue of the
moment is drug abuse. . . . People are suddenly paying a great deal of attention to (it) ...
Now, no other issue is as often cited as problem No. 1.").
2. Address to the Nation by President Reagan, reprinted in 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1183, 1184 (Sept. 14, 1986).
3. Id. at 1184. Reagan noted that his administration has made strides to curb this hor-
ror. Thirty-seven federal agencies are working toward this effort, and by 1987, spending for
drug law enforcement will have tripled since 1981. He also noted that there have been in-
creased seizures of illegal drugs and shortages of marijuana. Id.
4. Drug Free Federal Workplace, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301
(West Supp. 1987) [hereinafter Order].
5. H.R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 CONG. REc. 28, 460-61 (1986).
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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those with access to classified information and those whose work af-
fects public health or safety, are required to submit a urine sample
for analysis at the request of an agency head, regardless of whether
they have given any indication of drug use.' Not surprisingly, the
mandatory drug testing Order has proven to be the most controver-
sial element of President Reagan's anti-drug plan.
The Order has received wide media attention,9 sparked heated
comments from the legal community and federal employees' un-
ions,1" and served as the impetus for several law suits.1 Advocates of
the Order see testing as a means of assuring a safe work environ-
ment." Opponents view drug testing as an invasion of privacy and a
violation of fourth amendment protections against illegal searches. 8
Recent court rulings support the later view, that Reagan's
mandatory drug-testing program for federal workers is
8. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Rust, Drug Testing; The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 51;
The Assault on Drugs, L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 18, 1986, at 4, col. 1; Holub, ACLU Says
Rulings Favor Its View Against Drug Testing, S.J. Mercury News, Sept. 17, 1986, at 6A, col.
1; Staff, Federal Workers Sue Over Drug Tests; S.J. Employees Oppose Reagan Plan, S.J.
Mercury News, Sept. 17, 1986, at 6A, col. 4; Sandier, Reagan Announces Details of Plan to
Combat Drugs, L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 16, 1986, at 6, col. 1; Hess, Reagan's Anti-Drug
Plan Calls for Mandatory Tests, S.J. Mercury News, Sept. 16, 1986, at IA, col. 5; Hess,
Reagans Ask U.S. to Shun Drugs, S.J. Mercury News, Sept. 15, 1986, at IA, col. 5.
10. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 9, at 8A, col. 2 (quoting Robert Tobias, President of the
National Treasury Employees Union, who called the plan "a punitive dragnet designed to
ferret out users and abusers in a sector where there is no evidence of a drug problem.") (also
quoting Alan Adler, lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who called the
proposal "a blatant violation of the rights of American workers to be free of search and seizure
without probable cause."); Staff, supra note 9, at 6A, col. 4 (quoting Tobias, "No innocent
federal worker should be subjected to this demeaning urine test.") (also quoting Rep. Charles
E. Schumer, D-NY, "People will get unfairly branded as drug users and that's not American."
Id. at 6A, col. 5); Holub, supra note 9, at 6A, col. I (Dorothy Ehrlich, Executive Director of
the ACLU of Northern California noted that Reagan's plan violates the fourth amendment's
guarantee of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.).
11. See, e.g., Valid Civil Liberties Concerns, L.A. Daily J. Sept. 18, 1986, at 4, col. 1
("It didn't take long for federal employees to move against the president's executive order on
drug testing. Within twenty-four hours, the National Treasury Employees Union filed suit in
U.S. district court. . . ."); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F.
Supp. ,380 (E.D. La. 1986), rev'd, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987); National Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Weinberger, 640 F. Supp. 642 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd and remanded, 818 F.2d
935 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (probable jurisdiction noted); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Weinberger, 651 F. Supp 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
12. See, e.g., Rust, supra note 9, at 51 ("Employers respond that drug tests work -
both to identify drug users and to reduce the incidence of on-the-job accidents."); Lacayo,
Putting Them All to the Test, TiME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 61 ("Supporters of testing in general
argue that it is justified by pressing requirements of public health and safety.").
13. See, e.g., Holub, supra note 9, at 6A, col. 1 (ACLU claims Reagan's plan violates
the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizures); Hess, supra note
9, at 8A, col. 2.
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unconstitutional.14
This Comment discusses the fourth amendment implications of
mandatory urine testing as authorized by Executive Order 12564.
After addressing the provisions of the Order, explaining the funda-
mentals of urinalysis and the basis for considering it to be a search,
this Comment proposes that if mandatory urinalysis is to be justified
at all, it must be as an administrative search. The Comment then
considers the standard for determining the constitutionality of ad-
ministrative searches and applies this standard to mandatory drug
testing of federal employees. The Comment concludes that random
urine tests are reasonable under the fourth amendment only in ex-
tremely compelling circumstances.
II. Background
A. Executive Order 12564
Executive Order 12564 declares that "[d]rug use is having seri-
ous adverse effects upon a significant proportion of the national
workforce. . .. 5 It also maintains that drug users are less produc-
tive, absent more often, detrimental to department efficiency, and
pose a serious health and safety threat to the public."
To combat this apparent drug problem, the Order states that
"[t]he Federal government, as the largest employer in the Nation,
can and should show the way towards achieving drug-free work-
places through a program designed to offer drug users a helping
hand ... .
This program, formulated to aid drug users, subjects at least 1
million of the 2.8 million civilian"8 federal employees in sensitive po-
14. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 651 F. Supp. at 726 (concluding that
in light of the fourth amendment, plaintiffs were entitled to injunctiverelief against periodic
drug testing of civilian employees occupying "critical" positions with department of Army);
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (urinalysis of all
fire fighters for the presence of drugs violated the fourth amendment because a "reasonable
suspicion" on which testing could be based did not exist); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp.. 1507 (D.N.J. 1987) (court held mass urine testing of fire and police department em-
ployees violated the fourth amendment because there was no individualized basis or even gen-
eral job related basis for instituting mass urinalysis); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500(D.D.C. 1986) (drug testing of school bus attendant violated the fourth amendment because
there was no probable cause and the city had no particularized reason to believe plaintiff was a
drug user).
15. Order, supra note 4, at 224.
16. Order, supra note 4, at 225.
17. Order, supra note 4, at 225.
18. Order, supra note 4, at 229, § 7(e). For the purposes of the Order, employee means
all persons appointed in the Civil Service, but excludes those appointed in the armed services.
1988]
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sitions to random drug testing at an initial cost of $56 million."
Controversy has arisen over many aspects of this program. The
first such controversy is the use of the term "sensitive" to determine
whether an employee in such a position will be subjected to drug
tests.2" The Order defines "employee in a sensitive position" as one
who an agency head designates as sensitive, has been or may be
granted access to classified information, is serving under a Presiden-
tial appointment, is involved in law enforcement, or whose work af-
fects public health or safety or other functions requiring a high de-
gree of trust and confidence." This definition is vague and includes
broad categories of positions, 22 making it extremely difficult to calcu-
late how many people the Order could affect.2"
More importantly, the Order allows indiscriminate random
testing of workers where there is no reason to suspect drug use.2"
Under the Order, an agency head is given the discretion to decide
who must submit to a drug test and how often.2 5 An employee need
not be involved in an accident or unsafe practice or be suspected of
drug use before that employee may be tested for drugs. Any appro-
priate evidence is sufficient to determine whether an employee uses
illegal drugs.26
In addition, the Order does not articulate any specific procedure
or method to be followed when testing for drugs, but only specifies
that agency testing procedures must conform to the Secretary of
Id.
19. Sandier, supra note 9, at 6, col. 2 (Reagan stated that $500 million will go to en-
forcement, $56 million to test federal employees, $100 million to promote drug-free schools and
$100 million for state treatment.facilities.).
20. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 9, at 8A, col. 1 (leaders of federal employee unions and
the ACLU challenged the Administration to define "sensitive jobs.").
21. Order, supra note 4, at 229, § 7(d).
22. Order, supra note 4, at 229, § 7(d) (such as those positions mandating a high degree
of trust and confidence).
23. See, e.g., Sandier, supra note 9, at 6, col. 4. "White House officials refused to specu-
late on how many of the 2.8 million federal workers could be affected. The Office of Personnel
Management said the number with access to classified information alone surpasses the 1 mil-
lion mark." Id
24. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 9, at 8A, col. 2 (quoting Tobias who said this is a puni-
tive dragnet and there is no evidence of a drug problem in the federal sector).
25. See Order, supra note 4, at 226, § 3(a). "The head of each Executive agency shall
establish a program to test for the use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions. The
extent to which such employees are tested and the criteria for such testing shall be determined
by the head of each agency .. " Id.
26. Order, supra note 4, at 227, § 5(f). "The determination of an agency that an em-
ployee uses illegal drugs can be made on the basis of any appropriate evidence, including direct
observation, a criminal conviction, administrative inquiry, or the results of an authorized test-
ing program." Id.
[Vol. 28
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Health and Human Services' guidelines once promulgated. 7 The
Order does, however, state that absent suspected substitution or al-
teration of samples, procedures for providing urine specimens must
allow individual privacy.2" It also provides for retesting of those
workers who initially test positive.29
Finally, while the results of the tests must remain confidential
and cannot be used in criminal proceedings, 0 there are two major
consequences of testing positive. First, those found to be using drugs
are required to obtain counseling through an Employee Assistance
Program" and may be removed from their duties pending treat-
ment."2 Second, workers who are found to use illegal drugs will be
fired if they refuse treatment or do not refrain from future drug
use.
3 3
B. Detecting Employee Drug Use Through Urinalysis
There are three basic methods of biochemical urinalysis used to
detect marijuana use.3 4 The most common method is the Enzyme
27. Order, supra note 4, at 227, § 4(d).
28. Order, supra note 4, at 226-27, § 4(c). "Procedures for providing urine samples
must allow individual privacy, unless the agency has reason to believe that a particular indi-
vidual may alter or substitute the specimen to be provided." Id.
29. Order, supra note 4, at 227, § 5(e). "Preliminary test results may not be used in an
administrative proceeding unless they are confirmed by a second analysis of the same sam-
ple .. " Id. The Order does not mention whether a more accurate testing method is re-
quired when retesting.
30. Order, supra note 4, at 228, § 5(h).
31. Order, supra note 4, at 227, §§ 5(a), 7(f). An Employee Assistance Program is an
agency-based counseling program "that offers assessment, short-term counseling, and referral
services to employees for a wide range of drug, alcohol, and mental health problems that affect
employee job performance. Employee Assistance Programs are responsible for referring drug-
using employees for rehabilitation and for monitoring employees' progress while in treatment."
Id.
32. Order, supra note 4, at 227, § 5(c):
Agencies shall not allow any employee to remain on duty in a sensitive position
who is found to use illegal drugs, prior to successful completion of rehabilitation
through an Employee Assistance Program. However, as part of a rehabilitation
or counseling program, the head of an Executive agency may, in his or her
discretion, allow an employee to return to duty in a sensitive position if it is
determined that this action would not pose a danger to public health or safety or
the national security.
Id.
33. Order, supra note 4, at 227, § 5(d).
34. See, e.g., Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results For the
Purpose of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391 (1984). The three basic
methods include: (1) the enzyme multiplied immunoassay test (EMIT); (2) the gas chromatog-
raphy test (GC); and (3) the mass spectrometer test (MS) Id. at 391.
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Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT)."
The EMIT test is designed to detect the presence of tetrahydro-
cannabinol (THO) metabolites" after inhalation or ingestion of ma-
rijuana." Although the test is a choice method for large-scale drug
testing because it is inexpensive 8 and easily administered by un-
trained personnel,89 it has been criticized as being inaccurate and
misleading.' 0
There are several inherent defects in the EMIT test and in its
administration which render its accuracy questionable in determin-
ing drug intoxication. First, the EMIT test is only useful in deter-
mining recent marijuana use, not in measuring present intoxica-
tion."' Urinalysis detects the presence of THC metabolites (which
remain in the body long after the "high" or intoxicating state has
dissipated), but not the intoxicating element of marijuana, THC."'
Thus, it is impossible to determine whether a person is intoxicated at
35. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LAB. L.J. 42, 48
(1985). The EMIT is the test most widely used. Id. at 48. The other methods are less fre-
quently used because they are far more expensive to administer. For example, the GC test
costs between 3100-4200 per specimen, whereas the EMIT test costs between S15-420 per
specimen. In addition, the EMIT test is easily administered on the job, while the other tests
are more complex and must be conducted in a laboratory where an expert is available to
perform the test and read the results. See Rust, supra note 9, at 51-52.
36. Comment, supra note 34, at 391.
37. Comment, supra note 34, at 391.
38. See, e.g., Rust, supra note 9, at 51 (tests cost $15-425 each and necessary equipment
costs about $5000).
39. Rust, supra note 9, at 51. Antibodies specific for certain drugs are added to vials of
urine, causing the contents to change color when those drugs are present, much like a home
pregnancy test. See also Comment, supra note 34, at 392-93. The EMIT test is found in an
inexpensive field kit that can be used outside of the laboratory environment. Id.
40. See Susser, supra note 35, at 48. See generally Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504
(N.D. Ind. 1985) (examining state and federal court treatment of the reliability problem of
EMIT urinalysis).
41. See Comment, supra note 34, at 397. Because urinalysis tests are designed to detect
THC metabolites, they cannot determine levels of intoxication. The THC metabolite is not the
intoxicating ingredient in marijuana but is a by-product of the intoxicating ingredient, THC.
Unlike THC, the THC metabolite remains in the body for an extended period of time. Since
urinalysis detects only the presence of the THC metabolite, it cannot determine whether an
individual is intoxicated at the time the test is administered. Id. See also Comment, Your
Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1451, 1457 n.40 (1986). Urine tests do not measure intoxication at the time
of testing, but instead determine whether the person tested "recently" used the drug. Id. at
1457 n.40.
42. Comment, supra note 34, at 397. See also Uelmen, Employee Drug Tests on Colli-
sion Course with Privacy, L.A Herald Examiner, Mar. 23, 1986, Comment, at F-I, col. 5
(Marijuana can be detected as long as 30 days after use); Dackis, Persistence of Urinary
Marijuana Levels After Supervised Abstinence, 139 Am. J. PSYCH. 1196 (1982).
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the time of testing.'3
Second, there is the danger that one might falsely test positive
for drug use without ever having used the drug." One way to falsely
produce a positive result is by passive inhalation of marijuana
smoke. 5 Another way that a false positive occurs is through "cross-
reactivity," where a substance ingested is misidentified as an illegal
substance.46 Substances which are said to create false positives
through cross-reactivity include: aspirin,' 7 herbal tea,"8 and thera-
peutic cold medicines such as Contac, Nyquil and Sudafed.49 More-
over, a false positive may occur when naturally-produced substances
in the body, such as enzymes, are detected and falsely identified as
drugs.5
Finally, improper handling, instrument malfunction, and
human error also play a role in the EMIT test's inaccuracy. As a
result of inexperienced personnel implementing and handling the test
in the work setting, there is an even greater chance for error than is
already present when tests are administered by technical personnel
in a controlled setting.51 Furthermore, chain of custody issues may
also arise, such as whether the specimen actually belonged to the
accused or whether it was tainted by other specimens.5"
Noting this tremendous potential for error and finding single,
unconfirmed EMIT tests unreliable, several courts5" and the execu-
43. See Rust, supra note 9, at 52. Because urinalysis indicates only that a drug has been
used in the recent past and it does not show whether the employee has used drugs on the job,
civil libertarians have rallied against inquiries into off-duty drug use, which they claim is an
invasion of privacy. Id.
44. See, e.g., Parham, Drug Testing Focus of Legal Challenge by Nuclear-Plant Work-
ers, L.A. Daily Journal, June 18, 1986, at 5, col. 1 (Centers for Disease Control found 4%
"false positive" ratio in the EMIT test); Lacayo, supra note 12, at 61 (Critics note that the
EMIT test is far less reliable than the 97%-99% accuracy which the manufacturer claims).
45. See, e.g., Zeidenberg, Marijuana Intoxication by Passive Inhalation: Documenta-
tion by Detection of Urinary Metabolites, 134 AM. J. PSYCH. 76 (1977).
46. Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, I DRUG L. REP. 25, 26 (1983).
47. Id.
48. Stein, S.F. Votes to Ban Random Drug Tests in Workplace, L.A. Times, Nov. 19,
1985, pt. I, at 18, col. 3.
49. Rust, supra note 9, at 51.
50. Zeese, supra note 46, at 28.
51. See, e.g., Harris, Military's Faulty Drug-Testing Program Wrongly Punished
Thousands, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, pt. I, at 3, col. 1; Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine
Screening for Misused Drugs, Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, Oct.-Dec., 1984, vol. 16, at 4.
52. See, e.g., Wykoff, 613 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
53. Id. See also Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (Court sustained
preliminary injunction against imposing sanctions on prisoners based on one unconfirmed test);
Kane v. Fair, 33 Cr.L. 2492 (Mass. Superior Ct., Aug. 5, 1983); Johnson v. Walton, No. 561-
84 (Rutland Superior Ct., Vermont, Feb. 14, 1985) (EMIT test alone was not scientifically
19881
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tive branch, through Executive Order 12564 have recognized the
need to confirm a positive EMIT test with a more reliable alterna-
tive method of analysis. The manufacturer of the EMIT test5" itself
recommends that a urine test be followed with a confirmation test to
establish positive use of a drug."
Discounting the numerous criticisms of the accuracy of urinal-
ysis by the EMIT test, and assuming it is a valid indicator of drug
use, President Reagan's mandatory drug tests by urinalysis must still
survive the constitutional challenge to be considered valid.
C. Fourth Amendment Requirements
The fourth amendment 6 protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures5 7 of the person and those things in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy." Consequently, extending fourth
amendment protection to federal employees subjected to drug tests
requires an initial determination that these urinalysis tests are
"searches" within the meaning of this amendment.
reliable).
54. See Rust, supra note 9, at 51 (SYVA Laboratories of Palo Alto, California).
55. Id. The Gas Chromatography (GC) and Mass Spectrometer (MS) tests are used
most frequently for confirmation because of their higher degree of accuracy. GC and MS tests
reduce the drug's constituent chemicals to their molecular level and identify the "fingerprint"
of a specific drug. Id.
56. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be searched.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. A "search" connotes an exploratory investigation, invasion, or a prying into a hid-
den place for what is concealed. A "seizure" implies a forcible dispossession of the owner, not
a voluntary surrender. Bielicki v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371
P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The ex-
tension of fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures of those
things in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy was fleshed out in Katz. Before
Katz, the traditional approach to what was protected under the fourth amendment focused on
intrusion into constitutionally protected "areas." Katz rejected this approach and instead,
shifted fourth amendment emphasis from the constitutional protection of "areas" to the protec-
tion of "privacy." Katz stated "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
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1. Is Urinalysis a Search?
To constitute a search, one's reasonable expectation of privacy
to be free from governmental intrusion must be invaded.59 To deter-
mine whether one's reasonable expectation of privacy has been in-
vaded, one must first have exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy, and, second, that expectation must be one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.60
Cases have established that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in what one has knowingly subjected to public exposure.61
Thus, courts have held voice samples62 and writing samples" not to
be searches because of the expected public exposure they involve,
while they have held the taking of blood samples, 4 pubic hair sam-
ples,6" fingernail scrapings,6 ' and X-rays6 7 to constitute searches.
Applying the Katz v. United States6" reasonable expectation of
privacy test to urinalysis, most courts find it indistinguishable from
the blood test held to be a search in Schmerber v. California.9 One
59. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
60. Id. at 361. Applying these requirements to the situation in Katz, the Court con-
cluded that Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy was violated and therefore a search had
taken place. Id. at 353. Katz involved the bugging of a public phone booth from which Katz, a
bookie, conducted his business. Id. at 348. The Court determined that Katz had an actual and
reasonable expectation of privacy that his phone conversation would be kept private when he
placed his call in a phone booth and closed the door behind him. Id. at 361. By entering the
phone booth, Katz sought to exclude the uninvited ear and the government invaded this inter-
est by bugging his conversation. Id. at 352. Therefore, the government action constituted a
search. Id. at 353.
61. Id. at 351. The Court stated that the fourth amendment provides no protection for
what a person knowingly exposes to the public, but does protect what a person seeks to pre-
serve as private. Id.
62. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
64. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the defendant was
arrested for drunken driving, and a blood sample was extracted from him over his objection by
a physician acting pursuant to police orders. Id. at 758-59. Relying on language in the fourth
amendment that individuals have a right to be secure in their persons, the Court held the
forced blood test to be a search within the fourth amendment. Id. at 767. The Court did,
however, find the search reasonable due to the exigent circumstances involved. Id. at 770-71.
65. Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
67. United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
68. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See also Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.
N.Y. 1984) (The Court stated "although [urinalysis] involves no forced penetration of body
tissues, as does a blood test, it does involve the involuntary extraction of body fluids. In that
sense, if not literally, it is an 'intrusion beyond the body's surface.' ") (quoting Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 769-70).
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such case is Storms v. Coughlin,0 which involved a prison program
of random testing for traces of narcotics and marijuana in the urine
of prisoners. Noting that interests in human dignity forbid searches
intruding beyond the body's surface and that being forced to perform
a private bodily function into a bottle held by another is simply de-
grading,71 the court in Storms found urinalysis to be a search that
violates one's reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore must
be afforded the same protection given blood tests by Schmerber7
More recently, the court in American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees v. Weinberger73 stated that "[t]he taking of a urine
sample most closely resembles the taking of a blood sample" which
has been held to be a search by Schmerber. The reasons for this
comparison were articulated best by the district court in Capua v.
City of Plainfield when it stated:
Though urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged from
the body so that no actual intrusion is required for its collection,
it is normally discharged and disposed of under circumstances
that merit protection from arbitrary interference.
Both blood and urine can be analyzed in a medical labora-
tory to discover numerous physiological facts about the person
from whom it came, including, but not limited to recent inges-
tion of alcohol or drugs. . . .As with blood, each individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal 'infor-
mation' bodily fluids contain. For these reasons, governmental
taking of a urine specimen constitutes a search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 7'
Apart from likening urinalysis to a blood test, courts which
have focused solely on urinalysis, have applied the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test and found a sufficient infringement of pri-
vacy for urinalysis to be considered a search. Applying the first
prong of the Katz test, whether one has exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy, courts have found that "most people
• ..have a certain degree of subjective expectation of privacy in the
act of urination.""' This expectation of privacy may differ depending
upon the individual being tested. Some might not mind being com-
70. 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
71. Id. (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70).
72. Id.
73. 651 F. Supp. 726, 733 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
74. 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986) (citations omitted) (Capua upheld a chal-
lenge to mass urine testing by city fire fighters and police department employees).
75. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 880.
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pelled to urinate in front of another, while others might find forced
urination extremely offensive.
Not only do most people expect privacy while urinating, they
also expect that the contents of their urine will be kept private and
will not be analyzed to determine the contents thereof.7 6 Moreover,
in the labor context, courts have noted that employees subjectively
expect to be free from intrusive urine testing while on the job. Most
employees are not warned prior to accepting employment that sub-
mission to compulsory urine testing might become a condition of con-
tinued employment.7
Noting that one generally has a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy in the act of urination and the contents thereof, one must then
determine whether that expectation of privacy is one that society rec-
ognizes as reasonable. In making this determination, one must first
acknowledge that urination has traditionally been considered a pri-
vate act. The excretion of body fluids and body wastes is one of the
most personal and private functions a human performs. 8
Furthermore, this act has historically been conducted in private.
As a result, bathrooms at home and in public places accommodate
this privacy interest by providing a private room or stall in which to
urinate. Indeed, society has generally condemned urination in public.
This ban on public urination is evidenced by the enactment of many
municipal ordinances making urination in public unlawful. 79 For
these reasons, it is apparent that the expectation of privacy involved
in the act and contents of urination is one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.
Finally, without laboring through the Katz analysis, contempo-
rary cases concede that taking a person's urine and testing it for
drugs is a search. 80 Early on this principle was demonstrated by the
court in Allen v. City of Marietta, which felt "constrained by current
law to hold that urinalysis is a search. ... "' More recently, the
court in American Federation of Government Employees stated "[i]f
76. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
77. Id. at 1515. The court concluded that because no provisions for mass urine testing
were included in the collective bargaining agreement signed by the fire fighters and the city
and that a policy statement authorizing the city to conduct such tests was never communicated
to the fire fighters, the fire fighters reasonably expected to be free from government urine
testing on the job. Id.
78. Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 588-89 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
79. See Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.
80. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987); Feliciano, 661
F. Supp. at 584; Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513; Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 879.
81. 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
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at one time it might have been possible to argue that urinalysis does
not constitute a search or seizure, such an argument is now entirely
untenable."82
2. Is the Search Reasonable?
Noting that urine tests are considered searches by modern
courts, one must next question whether the search was reasonable
and therefore not violative of the fourth amendment.
a. Erosion of Warrant and Probable Cause
Requirements
The fourth amendment does not prohibit governmental searches
under all circumstances, but sets forth a standard under which a rea-
sonable search may be conducted and requires that a neutral and
detached magistrate issue a warrant authorizing that search.8" Ordi-
narily, the standard is that there must be "probable cause" to believe
that a violation of the law has occurred before the individual in-
volved may be subject to a search by the government. 8 ' After such
cause is shown, a warrant may be issued.
Recognizing the need for a warrant, the Supreme Court has
held that warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the
fourth amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." 85 These exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement generally involve exigent circumstances where the evi-
dence is likely to disappear or be destroyed while a warrant is being
obtained 6 or where there is immediate danger to the community or
82. 651 F. Supp. at 732.
83. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The magistrate's neutrality in-
creases the likelihood that a correct decision as to the existence of probable cause will be
reached before a search is made, and that unconstitutional searches will be kept to a minimum.
Id. at 467.
84. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part). There is probable cause to search "where 'the facts and circumstances within the offi-
cials' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a criminal offense had
occurred .. " (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). Id. at 358.
85. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (quoting Coo-
lidge, 403 U.S. at 454-55).
86. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. Schmerber's conviction was upheld because
the arresting officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emer-
gency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened
'the destruction of evidence.'" (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
Id. See also Cupp, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). The Court held that traces of blood and skin under
the defendant's nails would likely disappear, therefore a limited warrantless search was justi-
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police officers. 87 Hence, when there is probable cause to conduct a
search and "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search," '88 a warrant sometimes
need not be obtained.
A series of cases involving searches of government employees
has surfaced among the exceptions to the warrant requirement." In
addition, these exceptions have not demanded a level of suspicion
based on probable cause as an absolute requirement to a reasonable
warrantless search.90 Rather, to determine the level of suspicion
needed to justify a search in these cases, the courts have applied a
test which balances the invasion which the search entails against the
government's need to search.91
The Supreme Court case which fleshed out this balancing test
was Camara v. Municipal Court.9" In Camara, the Supreme Court
held that a warrant was required to conduct a routine housing in-
spection for safety violations.98 The Court then proceeded to deter-
mine what level of cause was required for a reasonable search. In
making this determination, the Court noted that the government had
a strong need to search in order to maintain public health and safety.
It also stressed that the inspections were not conducted as part of a
fled to preserve the evidence. Id.
87. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (firemen may enter burning
building without a warrant to control fire).
88. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
89. See, e.g., Allen, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (Warrantless search of City
employee's urine for the presence of drugs); United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966) (Warrantless search of Custom's employee's jacket);
United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975)
(Warrantless search of Postal employee's locker for stolen mail).
90. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 ("The
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable,
and although 'both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the
reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required.' ").
91. Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The-Court used the Camara balancing test to determine
the level of cause needed to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. See also Storms, 600 F. Supp. at
1220 (discussing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The Court in Bell questioned whether
visual body-cavity inspections in a jail could ever be conducted on less than probable cause.
Balancing the significant security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the
inmates, the Bell Court concluded they could. The Storms Court followed suit and held that
prison officials could test urine without probable cause. Id.
92. 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).
93. Id. at 540. While a warrant was required, it was not the traditional warrant usually
required in criminal proceedings. Instead, an administrative warrant was required. Id. at 538.
Subsequent cases have dispensed with the warrant requirement in exceptional circumstances,
but have still utilized the Camara balancing test to determine the level of suspicion required
for a reasonable search.
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criminal proceeding, but as part of an administrative investigation
seeking to remedy safety violations.94 Because only administrative
sanctions were involved, the Court felt that the invasion involved was
minimal. Therefore, by balancing the government's need to search
against the invasion involved,"3 the Court concluded that a standard
less than that required by the traditional probable cause test was
necessary for the inspector to validly conduct the type of administra-
tive search involved in Camara."
Recent cases involving searches for administrative purposes,
such as Capua"7 and Feliciano v. City of Cleveland," have applied
the Camara balancing test and determined that a lesser standard of
suspicion is necessary to conduct a reasonable warrantless search. In
Capua, city fire fighters challenged a department procedure which
subjected them to unannounced urine tests. In striking down the
plan as unreasonable, the court stated that "[t]he Fourth Amend-
ment allows defendants to demand urine of an employee only on the
basis of a reasonable suspicion predicated upon specific facts and
reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of experi-
ence."' 9 Clarifying this standard, the court stated that "[tlhe reason-
able suspicion standard requires individualized suspicion, specifically
directed to the person who is targeted for the search."' 00 Applying
this standard, the court concluded that because the city lacked any
specific suspicion as to the individual fire fighter's drug use, the
search was unreasonable."'
The Capua approach was also followed in Feliciano. 2 In Feli-
ciano, Cleveland police academy cadets challenged a departmental
plan requiring academy cadets to submit to surprise mass urine tests.
The court applied the Camara balancing test and held that the
fourth amendment allows police officials to demand a urine specimen
for chemical analysis without a warrant only if a "reasonable indi-
vidualized suspicion that a police officer is using illicit drugs. .. ."
can be demonstrated.' 03 The court concluded that a tip intimating
that current members of the police academy were known to use
94. Id. at 538.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 537.
97. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
98. 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
99. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1517.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
103. Id. at 589.
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drugs was insufficient to make the taking of urine samples constitu-
tionally reasonable because there was no reasonable suspicion of
drug use directed at any particular member of the class.'" The rea-
sonable suspicion standard therefore was not met because no individ-
ualized suspicion was shown.
The reasonable suspicion standard was also applied in New
Jersey v. T.L.O. 105 In T.L.O., a school official's warrantless search
of a student's purse for cigarettes, after that student had been found
smoking in violation of a school rule, was challenged as an unreason-
able search and seizure. 0 6 After striking the Camara balance be-
tween the school children's privacy interest and the school's need to
maintain a learning environment,10 7 the Court concluded that a
search of a student should depend, under all the circumstances, on
the reasonableness of the search.108
In determining the reasonableness of a search, the Court ap-
plied the two-pronged test articulated in Terry v. Ohio.109 "[F]irst,
one must consider 'whether the . . . action was justified at its incep-
tion,' . . . second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.' "110 Under the
Terry test, a search is " 'justified at its inception' when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evi-
dence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or
the rules of the school." 1
Similarly, Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn."' recently
adhered to the T.L.O. reasoning that a search must be justified at its
inception. 8 Like Capua, Lovvorn involved a city's plan to urine
test its fire fighters for the presence of drugs. In determining what
level of suspicion was required to conduct this type of search, the
court found that "[w]hile probable cause would not be required for
the City to conduct urine tests, the balancing of the interests of the
104. Id. at 580.
105. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
106. Id. at 329.
107. Id. at 337.
108. Id. at 341. The Court stated that the school setting requires some modification of
the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search and that probable cause was
not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. Id.
109. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Terry used the Camara balancing test to determine the level of
suspicion needed to conduct police "stop and frisks.").
110. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
111. Id. at 342.
112. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
113. Id. at 882.
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[C]ity and the individual requires some quantum of individualized
suspicion before the tests can be carried out. This quantum may be
denoted as 'reasonable suspicion.'""4
The Lovvorn court found that the reasonable suspicion-justified
at its inception requirement had not been satisfied. Prior to imposing
urinalysis, the city failed to demonstrate that any specific fireman's
job performance, physical condition or mental capacity was im-
paired. Therefore, there were no reasonable grounds to suspect that
any fire fighter would test positive for illegal drugs ."'
Most recently, the court in Policemen's Benevolent Association
of New Jersey v. Township of Washington" 6 complied with the stan-
dard articulated in T.L.O. by stating that a search under the fourth
amendment must be "justified at its inception," and "reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place.""" It also encompassed the Capua-Feliciano reasona-
ble suspicion standard by finding that a search of a municipal em-
ployee may be conducted "upon reasonable suspicion based on objec-
tive facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.""' In
Township of Washington, the Township's proposed warrantless
drug testing plan of municipal employees was challenged as an un-
reasonable search and seizure." 9 Applying the justified at its incep-
tion-reasonable suspicion requirement, the court found the Town-
ship's reliance on statistics depicting a nation-wide drug problem
insufficient to support the testing of local police officers. The court
concluded there was no assertion in the statistics that any particular
member of the Washington Township police force had been involved
in illegal drug use. 2
One may glean from the aforementioned cases that when a war-
rantless search is conducted for administrative purposes and not as
part of a criminal proceeding, the government must demonstrate a
reasonable, individualized suspicion that a violation of the law has
occurred before the government search will be found reasonable.
There are, however, some circumstances under which a blanket war-
rantless search may be conducted without some measure of individu-
114. Id. at 880.
115. Id.
116. 672 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1987).
117. Id. at 790.





alized suspicion. 1' This exception is known as the administrative
search. If mandatory urinalysis is found to be a warrantless search
not based on a reasonable, individualized suspicion, it must be con-
sidered as an administrative search in order to be found reasonable.
b. The Administrative Search
An administrative search usually involves some form of area in-
spection and is based on knowledge of conditions in the area as a
whole. " ' Camara' is the seminal case defining the parameters of a
reasonable administrative search.
In Camara, the Court required an administrative warrant1 24 tojustify routine housing inspections within a specific area, but did not
require "specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwell-
ing' 1 25 to enter any residence. The Court, in finding the administra-
tive search reasonable by balancing the need to search against the
invasion involved, weighed heavily the government's interest in pub-
lic health and safety, realized that safety violations are not always
visible from the outside, and recognized that the object of the search
was not to gather evidence of criminal activity.' 26
Blanket searches requiring no individualized suspicion, but only
area-wide generalized suspicion, have since been found reasonable in
other areas. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the
Court concluded that Congress has plenary power to authorize war-
rantless searches at the United States border without a showing of
probable cause. Similarly, in United States v. Skipwith, 28 blanket
searches for weapons and explosives in airport departure areas were
found reasonable. Finally, warrantless searches of briefcases and
purses upon entering federal courthouses were also found to pass
constitutional muster in Downing v. Kunzig.1"9
121. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). To have a consti-
tutional search, individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite. "But the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Id. at 561.
122. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967).
123. Id. See also supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 538. Probable cause to issue an administrative warrant exists if "reasonable
legislative or administrative inspection standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular dwelling." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). See also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545.
128. 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973).
129. 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
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On the other hand, warrantless searches for the purpose of dis-
covering drugs and alcohol on patrons attending rock concerts have
not been found constitutionally reasonable administrative searches
under the fourth amendment. " ' The determination of whether an
administrative search is considered reasonable has been made by the
courts by applying the Camara balancing test once again. " '
In summary, cases have established that the Camara balancing
test, which balances the need to search against the invasion involved,
is used in two different contexts to determine whether warrantless
searches are reasonable. In the first instance, the balancing test is
used to formulate the level of suspicion required to conduct a reason-
able warrantless search. Using this test, cases have established that a
reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a reasonable warrantless
search. In the second situation, if the reasonable suspicion standard
has not been met, the courts use the Camara balancing test to deter-
mine whether a valid administrative search, which requires no indi-
vidualized or particularized suspicion, has been conducted.
Therefore, to determine whether President Reagan's plan is
constitutional, one must first examine whether warrantless random
urine tests are reasonable. This necessarily entails a discussion of
what standard of suspicion is required to conduct reasonable war-
rantless searches. Secondly, if warrantless urine tests fail to meet the
standard of suspicion required by such cases as Capua, Feliciano,
T.L.O. and Township of Washington, one must then determine
whether urinalysis is justified as an administrative search.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Noting that urine tests are intrusions into areas where individu-
als have a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus constitute
searches, the question then becomes whether the intrusions author-
ized by the Order are unreasonable and therefore violate the fourth
amendment.
A. Is the Warrantless Search Reasonable?
1. Level of Suspicion Needed to Justify a Search
To determine the level of suspicion needed to conduct a reason-
able warrantless search, courts apply the Camara balancing test
130. Gajoni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F.
Supp. 1134 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
131. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35.
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which balances the invasion which the search entails against the gov-
ernment's need to search.' Because urine tests are investigative in
nature, rather than conducted for criminal prosecution purposes, 83
the balancing test advocated in Camara is the most appropriate test
to measure the level of suspicion required for a reasonable search.
The Camera balancing test allows for a more flexible standard of
suspicion in urinalysis cases than the traditional probable cause stan-
dard required in criminal proceedings.
a. The Camara Balancing Test
i. The Need to Search
President Reagan asserts in Executive Order 12564 that drug
use is having serious adverse effects upon the federal workforce. 8
Similar to Camara, President Reagan also asserts potential health
and safety threats to the public as justifications for the government's
need to search by conducting drug tests.' 35
ii. The Invasion Involved
Like the administrative search conducted in Camara, urine test-
ing under the Order is not conducted as part of a criminal proceed-
ing. Rather, the results of urine tests may be used to terminate em-
ployment or force employees to seek counseling. 3 Under the
Camara reasoning then, because only administrative sanctions are
involved, the intrusion suffered is minimal. Thus by balancing the
need to search against the invasion involved, one can reason that the
level of suspicion required for a reasonable warrantless search may
be less than the probable cause standard commonly used in criminal
investigations. But unlike Camara, the sanctions threatened by the
Order, i.e. loss of a job, are more severe than the consequences re-
sulting from a housing inspection. In addition, the method of search
mandated by the Order, i.e. urine testing, is more intrusive than the
housing inspection involved in Camara. Therefore, a standard
greater than that afforded routine housing inspections is warranted.
Such a standard was applied in Capua,3 7  Feliciano,"'
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
134. See Order, supra note 4, at 224.
135. See Order, supra note 4, at 225.
136. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
137. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
138. 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
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T.L.O."'89 and Township of Washington. "°
b. The Reasonable, Individualized Suspicion Standard
i. Capua v. City of Plainfield-Feliciano v. City of Cleveland
In order to conduct a reasonable warrantless search under the
standard set forth in Capua and Feliciano, a reasonable suspicion;
based on specific objective facts that the particular employee is then
under the influence of drugs must be shown. 4'
Under the Capua-Feliciano reasonable suspicion standard, an
agency head seeking to conduct a warrantless search under the Order
would be required to show specific objective facts implicating the
specific individual to be tested. The urinalysis proposed in President
Reagan's Order, however, fails to meet this standard. It would allow
indiscriminate random testing of all federal workers in sensitive posi-
tions, regardless of whether they have acted suspiciously. 42 This
"dragnet" drug testing at the whim of agency heads ignores the dic-
tates of the fourth amendment by not requiring any individualized
suspicion. Dragnet testing, by definition, tests masses of people; it
does not single out specific individuals to be tested based on their
behavior.
ii. New Jersey v. T.L.O.-Policemen's Benevolent Association of
New Jersey v. Township of Washington
Under the standard set forth in T.L.O. and Township of Wash-
ington, a search must depend on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search. 48 To determine the reasonableness of a
search, one must first consider whether the action was justified at its
inception, and second, whether the search was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." A search is justified at its inception when there are reasona-
ble grounds for suspecting that the search will uncover evidence of a
violation of the law.' 45
The search at issue in the Order appears to squarely fail this
criterion of being justified at its inception. Because federal employees
139. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
140. 672 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1987).
141. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
143. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. See supra note 105-08 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
145. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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in sensitive positions may be tested for drugs regardless of whether
they have given any indication of drug use, there is no reason to
suspect that the search would turn up evidence of employee drug
use. By dragnet drug testing a large amount of people, the govern-
ment is taking a stab in the dark, hoping to find a drug user among
those tested. This sort of practice falls far short of the standard man-
dated in Capua, Feliciano, T.L.O., and Township of Washington,
which requires a reasonable suspicion directed at the person to be
searched. If the reasonable suspicion standard articulated in Capua-
Feliciano and T.L.O.-Township of Washington did not require spe-
cific articulated facts that the employee to be searched then be under
the influence of drugs, there would be no limit on a public official's
power to search.146 He could search anyone, anywhere, whenever a
serious crime is threatened.
Because President Reagan's Order does not satisfy the reasona-
ble suspicion standard, the only way blanket warrantless urinalysis
may be conducted without some measure of individualized suspicion
is as an administrative search.
2. Urinalysis as an Administrative Search
The test for determining whether a warrantless administrative
search is reasonable and therefore not violative of the fourth amend-
ment requires balancing "the need to search" against the "invasion
which the search entails."14 Thus, to determine whether the federal
government may subject an employee to a warrantless urinalysis test,
one must balance the government's interest in searching with the em-
ployee's privacy interests in avoiding the search. 48
a. The Need to Search
The need to search entails examining the government's purpose
for enacting the Executive Order. The government asserts as its first
146. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 882. See also United States v. Davis, in which the court
held that Terry did not justify wholesale frisking of airline passengers. 482 F.2d 893, 907 (9th
Cir. 1973).
147. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35.
148. See Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1508 (Balanced bus attendant's reasonable expectation
of privacy from a search by mandatory urine testing for drugs against public safety considera-
tions); Allen, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (court balanced the individual's expectation
of privacy against the government's right as an employer to urine test); Bell, 441 U.S. at 559(In approving body cavity searches of prisoners, Court stated that the test of reasonableness
requires "a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal
rights that the search entails.").
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interest that "[flederal employees who use illegal drugs, on or off
duty, tend to be less productive, less reliable, and prone to greater
absenteeism than their fellow employees who do not use illegal
drugs. .. .19
A second justification stated for implementing the Order is that
the use of illegal drugs by federal employees "impairs the efficiency
of Federal departments and agencies, undermines public confidence
in them, and makes it more difficult for other employees who do not
use illegal drugs ...to perform their jobs effectively."' 0
Finally, the third reason advocated for conducting random urine
tests is that "[t]he use of illegal drugs . . . by federal employees also
can pose a serious health and safety threat to members of the
public. . ... 5'
To determine whether the interests asserted by the government
in the Executive Order are important enough to outweigh the inva-
sion of the search, one must examine the justifications held sufficient
in other administrative searches found to be reasonable. In cases in-
volving border searches,' the courts recognized the government's
very important interest in protecting the border from drug traffick-
ing, illegal alien entrance, contraband smuggling, international espi-
onage, and other security threats."' In the airport context, the courts
have emphasized the tremendous potential for mass violence that
could take place in an airplane bombing or high-jacking and the
need to intervene before such action occurs in upholding the searches
as reasonable. 5 ' Similarly, bombings, terrorism, and hostage situa-
tions in courthouses around the country were considered such public
safety threats, that searches at courthouse doors were found to be
reasonable."' Finally, some random urine searches of federal em-
ployees who worked around high voltage wires, 6" and of city mass
transit drivers' 57 have been upheld on the basis that the govern-
149. Order, supra note 4, at 225.
150. Order, supra note 4, at 225.
151. Order, supra note 4, at 225.
152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
156. Allen, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Employees worked for the Electrical
Division of the Board of Lights and Power. Since the nature of their work was hazardous, the
employers felt that drug use posed a public safety problem. Id. at 484.
157. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). In Division 241, the court held that the safety of




ment's paramount interest in protecting the public outweighed the
employees' expectation of privacy.
In contrast, in the rock concert situation, the courts found that
the searches were designed to seize drugs, not to combat public dan-
ger.' They noted that although the possession of drugs was some-
times illegal, it posed no danger to the public like a bomb or gun
would.
Consequently, it appears that the government must show a seri-
ous threat to the public safety in order for its interest in searching to
outweigh the individual's privacy interest. In examining the first two
justifications asserted by the Executive Order, it is evident that they
do rise to the level of combatting a public danger. Combatting absen-
teeism, lower productivity, inefficiency of federal departments, and
ineffective job performance is not equivalent to preventing mass vio-
lence, terrorist attacks, or mass transit accidents. As a result, such
justifications fail to outweigh the invasion which the search entails.
Although the first two government interests asserted are not suffi-
ciently compelling to outweigh an employee's privacy interest in not
being searched, the third justification of ameliorating serious public
health and safety threats would most certainly be considered compel-
ling enough.
While preventing public danger may be a valid reason for the
government to subject all federal employees in sensitive positions to
mandatory urine tests, it can be argued that only those federal em-
ployees who are responsible for the public health and safety should
be forced to submit to the warrantless urine tests. The government
might have a substantial interest in testing those who are in a posi-
tion to affect or jeopardize the lives of many, such as air traffic con-
trollers or law enforcement officers, but it does not have an over-
whelming interest in randomly testing those who only incidentally
have access to classified information and therefore pose no threat to
the public safety, such as an executive secretary. On the other hand,
one might argue that even executive secretaries with access to classi-
fied information might pose a threat to the public if that information
were revealed when blackmailed because of their drug use or if that
information were sold to support their drug habits. This possibility
would have to be recognized in the court's balancing process when
examining the government's need to search.
Assuming the government's interest in protecting the public is
deemed substantial, it must still outweigh the invasion involved to be
158. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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considered reasonable.
b. The Invasion Which the Search Entails
One can hardly deny that the physical and emotional aspects of
a mandatory urine test are extremely intrusive. Many courts find
urinalysis analogous to the indignity suffered in a body cavity
search,' 59 while others find it more degrading than a blood test.160
The court in Storms stated "[i]n a way in which having blood ex-
tracted could never be, being forced under threat of punishment to
urinate into a bottle held by another is purely and simply
degrading."' 61
Similarly, the Court in Terry'62 concluded that even a brief
frisk search is "an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience.""' If a brief frisk search is frightening, surely a proce-
dure requiring people to partially disrobe and expose their genitals
for inspection while urinating is an even more frightening and hu-
miliating experience.'
The court in Feliciano also recognized the intrusion involved
when urine is analyzed, because analysis enables an employer to dis-
cover the personal physiological secrets each person's urine holds,
such as if an employee is pregnant or on medication for a certain
illness.' 65
In addition to considering the scope of the intrusion, one must
also consider the manner in which it is conducted and the place in
which it is conducted. Since the Order has not yet articulated the
specific procedure or method to be followed when testing for drugs,
one can only speculate on how intrusive the procedure will be. How-
ever, one can glean from the fact that the Order must allow individ-
ual privacy when urinating except when substitution is suspected
and the fact that substitution has become rampant, that observation
will be required in almost all instances.
Finally, the effectiveness of the search must also be consid-
159. See, e.g., Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1220; Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124,
1129-30 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
160. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1220.
161. Id. at 1218.
162. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
163. Id. at 25.
164. Now that individuals are buying "pure urine" to pass drug tests and substituting it
for their own impure urine, employers are requiring close observation of the urination process.
See Freedburg, Anti-drug Testing Business Booming, S.J. Mercury News, Nov. 2, 1986, at
8A, col. 4.
165. Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 589.
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ered."6 In Schmerber,"7 the Court noted that a blood test was a
reasonable way to analyze blood-alcohol levels, because "[e]xtraction
of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means of determin-
ing the degree to which a person is under the influence of alco-
hol."16 In contrast, in Kuehn v. Renton School District,69 the court
struck down a blanket search of students' luggage for smuggled con-
traband because a less -onerous alternative of having parents search
their child's suitcase was available.
Urinalysis by the EMIT test is not a highly effective means of
determining drug use. It has been criticized as being inaccurate and
misleading by many sources.' It also has the potential for falsely
labeling those who have never used drugs as drug users. 7 ' Because
of the extended duration of THC metabolites in the urine after drug
use, the EMIT test cannot determine whether an employee is under
the influence of drugs at the time of testing. "' For this reason it is
not effective in determining present intoxication which is what is rel-
evant to someone's on-the-job performance.
Finally, the government must take into account possible less in-
trusive alternatives. Why not implement procedures analogous to the
sobriety tests used in alcohol intoxication cases? Presumably these
methods are equally effective, yet much less intrusive. Considering
the degree of intrusion involved in a urine test, any less onerous al-
ternative available should be used.
IV. CONCLUSION
Executive Order 12564 seriously effects the privacy of at least
one million federal employees who have been ordered to submit to
warrantless urine tests. These dragnet drug tests are not justified
under the fourth amendment reasonable suspicion standard because
no reasonable suspicion that a particular employee is then under the
influence of drugs is required. Consequently, the Executive Order
should be found unconstitutional.
The only way blanket urinalysis of federal employees in sensi-
166. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537-38. The Court allowed housing inspections for safety
violations based on the condition of an area as a whole because it was the only method that
would achieve acceptable results. Id.
167. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
168. Id. at 771.
169. 103 Wash. 2d 594, 600, 694 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1985).
170. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
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tive positions can be justified, is as an administrative search. In de-
termining whether urinalysis is a reasonable administrative search,
courts must balance the need to search with the invasion involved,
and must show that there are no less intrusive and effective alterna-
tives available. In light of the questionable accuracy of the EMIT
test in demonstrating drug use, and the substantial invasion which a
urine test entails, mandatory warrantless urine tests of all federal
employees in sensitive positions can only be justified in compelling
circumstances.
Mary E. Lathers
